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NOTES
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE MOTOR COMMERCEFEDERAL OCCUPATION OF THE FIELD?
The Congress of the United States in its latest sessions has shown a
marked interest in taxation of interstate motor commerce. Heretofore unchallenged, state activity in this field of interstate commerce is now the
subject of pointed inquisition. Senate Committee Hearings during the
eighty-first Congress revealed intense dissatisfaction with the status quo on
the part of both railroad and motor carriers.' In the latest session a bill
contemplating federal occupation of the field is before the Committee on
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. 2
Events leading to this legislative attention are well known. The rapid
growth of the motor vehicle as an interstate carrier caused destructive
competition between motors and rails only partly ameliorated by the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935. 3 Increasing use of state highways by the motor system
of interstate commerce has demanded high state expenditures on roads even
now inadequate because of World War II retrenchments in state road
building and repair.4 Finally, Supreme Court acquiescence in state tax
methods of doubtful fairness to interstate carriers demonstrates Court
reliance on the curative power of Congress should present state tax methods
raise commerce barriers. 5
The proposed legislation is a tax bill designed to supplant, in part,
present state taxes on interstate motor commerce by an annual federal tax.
As a pure revenue measure there is little doubt of the constitutionality of
the bill.6 What is doubtful is the impact that the bill portends in areas other
than taxation. Since this is the first significant interest shown by Congress
in the area of taxation of interstate motor commerce, the feasibility and
workability of the measure as a pattern for possible entry by Congress in
the field deserve to be examined. Whether or not the bill ever becomes
law it affords an opportunity to study the problem of taxation of interstate
motor commerce in a new light.
1. Hearings before Sub-Committee on Domestic Land and Water Transportation of the Committee on Interstate Commerce Pursuant to S. Res. 50, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 181, 1021 (1950).2. H.R. 1652, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) [hereinafter simply H.R. 1652].
3. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1946).

The Act was primarily directed

at relieving the rate disadvantage of the rails. Secondarily it assumed to provide
for limited I.C.C. regulation of those motor carriers which were competing with
the rails. See

n. 14 (1935).
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4. INmsRSTATE BARRIERs To TRucx TRANSPORTATION 86, 87 (U.S. Dep't Agric.
1950); Zettel, Taxation for Highways in California, 1 NAT. TAX J. 207 (1948);
PUBLIC Ams To TRANSPORTATION, H.R. Doc. No. 159, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 321
(1944).
5. See note 32 infra and text.
6. Hylton v. United States, 3 Dallas 171 (U.S. 1796).
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PRINCIPLES OF HIGHWAY TAXATION
The ground-breaking cases sanctioning state taxation of interstate
highway commerce coincide roughly with the large-scale appearance on the
transportation scene of the motor vehicle7 Considerations of safety on the
highways had led a large number of states to require all motor vehicle
owners to register their vehicles as a condition precedent to using state
roads. Proceeds of the registration fees were uniformly appropriated to
defray expenses of regulating traffic.8 When, at the instigation of a private
motorist, a sample of the newly-imposed state taxes was challenged as an
obstruction to interstate movement, the Supreme Court sustained the registration requirement as a valid exercise of the police power.9 The Court
held inapplicable decisions which forbade state taxation of interstate commerce, for ". . . where a state at its own expense furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate'as well as domestic,
it may exact compensation therefor." 10 Such taxes must be "reasonable
and fixed according to some uniform, fair and practical standard." 11
Finally, "the reasonableness of the state's action is always subject to inquiry [by this Court] as it affects interstate commerce, and in that regard
12
it is likewise subordinate to the will of Congress."
Shortly after this decision the Court in Kane v. New Jersey 13 expressly
sanctioned a registration fee, the proceeds of which were in excess of highway regulatory expenses, on the ground that a state may exact contributions to road costs as well as to regulatory expenses. 14 Thus the construction and maintenance of roads, normally the financial responsibility of the
public as a whole, became largely the financial responsibility of highway
users. In contradistinction to general taxation based on ability to pay,
a "benefit" type of taxation based on enjoyment and use of facilities was
initiated.' 5
7. HEALY, TiE EcoNomics OF TRANSPORTATION 16 (1946). The earliest significant decision in this area was Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
8. INTERSTATE TRADE BAmUERs (U.S. Dep't Commerce 1942) contains a study
of a representative cross-section of various state registration taxes. See also BIGHAM,
TRANSPORTATION PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 44 (1947).
9. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915). "In the absence of national
legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations
necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways
of all motor vehicles,--those moving in interstate commerce as well as others."
Id. at 622.
1
10. Id. at 624. For this proposition the Court cited Transportation Co. v.
Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 699 (1882) (wharfage collectible on municipally owned
pier) and Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548, 549 (1886) (tollage collectible for use
of state dredged channel).
11. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 624 (1915).
12. Id. at 622, 623. To what extent state taxation is subject to the will of
Congress has never been made clear. Recent decisions seem to presume at least a
corrective power in Congress. See, e.g., Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S.
542 (1950).
13. 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
14. Id. at 169.
15. The proposition was augured in Hendrick v. Maryland, supra note 9, at 624.
Ratification in Kane v. New Jersey, supra note 13, at 169 was unequivocal in view
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The emergence of the motor vehicle as a commercial carrier of passengers and property was viewed by the states as a further menace to highway maintenance and public safety. 16 Inspired also by powerful railroad
lobbies they levied special taxes on commercial property or passenger carriers. 17 In view of the more obvious approach of this manner of state
taxation to the condemnation of the commerce clause, the Court was harder
pressed for a justification. The result was the point-of-departure holding
in Clark v. Poor' 8 that "common carriers for hire, who make the highways
their place of business, may properly be charged an extra tax for such
use." 19 Highway economists have since regarded such "extra" taxes
as business franchise taxes. 20 Nevertheless the Court, by cataloging special
carrier taxes under the compensation doctrine,2 1 fulfilled a definite need of
the states for added revenues without doing violence to the case lore of the
commerce clause. Even now the concept of "doing local business" is not
extended to the point where a carrier doing purely interstate business can
be compelled to pay a franchise tax in every state along its itinerary.2
Decisions subsequent to 1927 virtually reiterated the principles set forth
earlier. The justification of any state tax on interstate motor commerce
is compensation.2 The methods of exacting the quantum meruit were the
next subject of Court examination.
of the taxpayer's direct attack on the "benefit" theory of taxation. He charged:
"Maintaining roads is one of the regular functions of government, and taxes to defray
the cost are like any other taxes levied to meet governmental expenses generally."
Id. at 162. For the distinction in theory between "benefit" taxation and "general"
taxation, see Zettel, supra note 4, at 209.
16. HEALY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 23; BIGHAM, op. cit. supra note 8, at 46.
17. INTFRSTATE TRADE BA mirs, supra note 8, at 72. Railroad inspiration of
the development of special carrier taxes is described by the National Highway User's
Conference in their publication THE ToN-MU=x TAX at page 8: "The demand for
these 'third structure' taxes has been supported, in some instances, by competing
transportation agencies. In many states it has actually been inspired by such groups
who feared the ultimate effect of highway transportation upon their own business.
This has been especially true among railroad representatives, many of whom, for
20 years, have been indefatigable in their efforts to place tax and regulatory burdens
upon motor vehicles and particularly upon those vehicles engaged in transporting
persons or property for hire or in connection with a commercial enterprise. These
efforts to curtail and restrict the use of public highways seem to be without limit
Some groups, not directly antagonistic, are inspired by no interest other than the desire to extract the last possible dollar of taxes from any indusry or enterprise in
which they themselves are not directly connected."
18. 274 U.S. 554 (1927).
19. Id. at 557.
20. Kauper, State Taxatitn of Interstate Motor Carriers,32 MIcH. L. REv. 171,
183 (1933).
21. See, e.g., Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U.S. 80, 82 (1929). The Court
is always ready to take judicial notice of the fact that carriers as heavier vehicles
must cause greater wear and tear on the highways as a pure matter of physics. But
there is no satisfactory proof that this extra wear and tear is not paid for in terms
of higher registrationfees imposed on carriers. See TnE Tox-MiLE TAX, spra note
17, at 20. See also DEARING, Am amcAN HIGHWAY PoLicy 212 (Brookings Institute
1941).
22. See note 45 infra and text.
23. Compensation in terms of what each vehicle should pay for actual highway
use is an immeasurable. Hearings, supra note 1, at 713 et seq. What is meant is
that the major part of a state's highway expenditures should be borne by users on
some hopefully equitable basis. Zettel, supra note 4, at 211.
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Supreme Court Development of State Taxing Methods.-Within the
broad limits of compensation a tax on the instrument of interstate highway
transportation is still a tax on interstate commerce. From time to time
the Court has had occasion to suggest by way of dictum its approach to
the problem of such taxes. Justice Brandeis in Interstate Transit, Inc. v.
Lindsey 24 coined the classic formula:
"The tax cannot be sustained unless it appears affirmatively, in
some way, that it is levied only as compensation for the use of the
highways or to defray the expense of regulating motor traffic. This
may be indicated by the nature of the imposition such as a mileage tax
directly apportioned to the use, . . . or by the express allocation of
the proceeds of the tax to highway purposes, . . or otherwise.
Where it is shown that the tax is so imposed, it will be sustained unless the taxpayer shows that it bears no reasonable relation to the
privilege of using the highways or is discriminatory." 25
As a restatement of the kinds of taxes theretofore sustained the statement
is incontrovertible. Every prior tax sustained had in fact shown some
formula supposedly reflecting road use, or in its absence some allocation of
26
proceeds to highway purposes.
Yet a close study of the Brandeis criterion shows that it is composed
of two separate elements: (1) compensation in the sense that the total
revenues exacted from all highway users may be expected to reimburse the
state for its outlay; (2) classification in the sense that users of the state
highways should contribute ratably inter se to what is proper compensation.
In other words, the first element is the justification of the tax as well as
the limitation on the total revenues which can be exacted; the second
invokes both the due process requirement of a reasonable (not arbitrary)
tax classification and the commerce clause requirement that interstate commerce be free from local discrimination.
Unfortunately both concepts have been lumped together into a "compensatory reasonableness" doctrine which permits the Court to treat a
given tax in the light of either compensation or classification singly. Thus
for many years the federal courts concerned themselves with formulation
or allocation or even the legislative declaration of the purpose of a particular
tax.27 The tests seemed to be: (1) is the tax a quid pro quo for the services afforded the carrier 2s or (2) are the total revenues in excess of compensation for the state's services. 29
24. 283 U.S. 183 (1931).
25. Id. at 186 (Emphasis added).
26. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915); (allocation); Kane v. New
Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (allocation); Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 (1927)
(formula and allocation) ; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928)
(formula and allocation). The Lindsey case, supra note 24, had neither formula nor
allocation and was held invalid. Cf. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928).
27. See note 26, supra.
28. E.g., Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931).
29. E.g., Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
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The reason that the Court so frequently considered formulation, allocation or even a legislative declaration of the purpose of a state tax can
best be explained by their supposed serviceability individually as measuring rods for ready determination of the "compensatory reasonableness" of
a given tax. But the supposition that a formula can indicate the compensatory nature of a tax is fanciful. When the question for decision is whether
or not, as determined by a particular formula, one cent per mile or five
cents per ton-mile is compensatory to the state, the answer inevitably
depends on many other factors totally unrelated to the equities of a formula.
In terms of state expenditures on road maintenance and traffic safety, one
cent per mile conceivably may be unreasonable for the safety and travel
facilities the taxing state affords. 80 With respect to the value of a legislative declaration, it is apparent that when the issue is the burdensome effect
of a tax on interstate commerce, no declaration has binding effect on the
Court.8 1

Allocation of proceeds of a tax to the state highway fund is no better
as an index when used by itself. Of course the balance sheet of the state
highway department would seem to pose ready evidence of whether or not
state taxes exact an unreasonable return for facilities offered. Since
highway expenditures are presumably some function of the condition of the
roads, the income from motor taxes should be approximately equal to the
highway expenditures. When they are not, the compensatory nature of
highway user taxes may well be questioned. On the other hand, a perfect
equivalence of tax proceeds and highway expenditures is no assurance that
interstate motor commerce as a unit is not paying more than its share to the
upkeep of the state highway system thus raising tax classification problems.
For example the income from highway tax receipts may equal expenditures,
yet interstate vehicular commerce might be paying the way of the private
automobile. It seems clear, then, that formulation or allocation do not lend
themselves singly to the determination of the compensatory nature or even
reasonablenessof a given tax.
Present Position of the Federal Courts-The latest Supreme Court
decision involving the compensation doctrine indicates that Court emphasis
has now been shifted from tax classification to considerations of overall
compensation. Again the emphasis is one-sided, this time neglecting the
classification aspects of the tax. Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice82 involved a state titling tax applied to interstate and intrastate carriers, measured by the market value of the vehicle at the time of registration in the
state. Mr. justice Black in his opinion for a majority of the Court stated
that a carrier to contest a tax must show ". . . that the amount of the
30. Hearings, rsupra note 1, at 1043, 1051-1053.
31. Kauper, supra note 20, at 189, 190.
32. 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
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taxes imposed on [all] carriers will always be in excess of fair compensation." 33
Mr. Justice Black would allow by inference an attack on the classification aspects of the tax:
"Our adherence to existing rules does not mean that any group
of carriers is remediless if the total Maryland taxes are out of line
with fair compensation due to Maryland. Under the rules we have
previously prescribed . . . such carriers may challenge the taxes

as applied, and upon proper proof obtain a judicial declaration of their
invalidity as applied." s4
The necessary result of this reasoning is that any state tax will be sustained
provided the total revenues of all highway taxes approximate compensation.
Should the revenues be grossly in excess, a simple means of statutory repair is open to the state. The state merely reduces the tax rate. The carrier, however, is left in this predicament. It may contest the tax structure
on compensation grounds which in the long run will only serve to lessen the
rate. Or individually or by groups, carriers may seek to obtain a judicial
declaration of invalidity as applied to them. The offending exaction remains, more obnoxious because a few astute carriers may escape it. From
the practical standpoint, the concomitant juggling and adjusting of rates
which would result if such diverse attacks were successful bode a prohibitive system of carrier bookkeeping.35
More significant is the attitude of the Court with respect to its role
in contests over state taxes on interstate carriers. The attitude presumes
state legislative responsibility ultimately reviewable by Congress. "If a
new rule prohibiting taxes measured by vehicle value is to be declared, we
think Congress should do it." 3' The attitude is based on defensible grounds
in view of the complexities involved in Court application of the compensa37
tion doctrine.
33. Id. at 544.

34. Id. at 547.

35. A carrier may be required to pay several taxes in a single state. Should
the aggregate of taxes collected be in excess of compensation to the state, the state
could repair the statute by reducing the rate on a single tax. See note 48 infra and
text.

36. Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, supra note 32, at 547.
37. Mr. Justice Black dissenting earlier in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 184 (1940), had observed: "The cost entailed by consruction and maintenance of modern highways creates for the forty-eight States one of
their largest financial problems. A major phase of this problem is the proper
apportionment of the financial burden between those who use a State's highways for
trasportation within its borders and those who do so in the course of interstate
transportation. Striking a fair balance involves incalculable variants and therefore
is beset with perplexities. The making of these exacting adjustments is the business
of legislation-that of State legislatures and of Congress."
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The Capitol Greyhound case is extreme in its treatment of the classification aspect of the contested tax.38 Yet, this demonstrated Court bias
towards upholding state tax statutes striking interstate highway commerce
is commendable. Until Congress ultimately enters the field, the power of
the states to tax for compensation for the use of their highways should
remain as free as possible. The highways are as important to national
commerce as the carriers that use them. This area is hardly the place for
a restriction so severe as to create a hiatus demanding the attention of
Congress.3 9
Significantly, Supreme Court acquiescence in state taxes allowed under
the compensation doctrine has been construed by the.lower federal courts
to mean acquiescence in other forms of state taxes. Thus in Spector Motor
Service v. O'Connor,40 Judge Clark felt swayed by the Court's attitude
in the compensation cases to uphold a franchise tax on a motor carrier engaged solely in interstate commerce. 41 Although the tax in the Spector
case was not in the strict sense a compensation tax, it was inextricably
connected with the compensation theory. In Clark v. Poor,42 the Supreme
Court had justified special carrier-for-hire taxes as an extension of the
compensation doctrine.43 Meanwhile highway economists pointed out
that such special carrier-for-hire taxes are in reality business franchise
taxes.

44

When the case came before the Supreme Court, however, a majority
of the Court, pitching their decision on the grounds that the exaction was
a direct burden on interstate commerce, invalidated the tax. 45 The result
seems sound. While gaping holes appear in the compensation outlet of
the commerce clause, state taxes limited to a quantum meruit are less likely
38. Three carriers contested the tax. Their distances of travel through Maryland were 9, 41 and 64 miles respectively, for which they paid $515.17, $580 and
$572.55 respectively. Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, supra note 32, at 346.
39. In Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925), and Bush and Sons Co. v.
Malony, 267 U.S. 317 (1925), the Court held that a state could not regulate
competition between interstate carriers. This hiatus of control over an instrument of
commerce needing control precipitated Congress' entry of the regulatory field. Realizing that the income of the states is not to be so summarily cut off, the Court reversed its attitude in the taxation field. The states now have virtually free "taxing" leeway. As a corollary, interstate motor commerce must now wait for Congress
to enter the field to rescue it should state taxation cause it hard abuse. See RAmAswAmY, THE COMMERcE CLAUSE 91-95 (1948).
40. 181 F.2d '150 (2d Cir. 1950).
41. The case had come before Judge Clark earlier. See Spector Motor Service
v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1944). There, after an examination of the attitude of
the Supreme Court in cases involving state taxation of interstate motor carriers, he
concluded: "If a highway tax based on the difficult and uncertain formula of mileage
within the State is to be sustained, it is clear that similar taxes, based on formulas
which are less arbitrary than that of mileage, must be equally valid." Id. at 815.
In his latest brush with the nine year Spector saga, supra note 40, at 153, Judge
Clark approved his earlier analysis and again upheld the tax.
42. 274 U.S. 554 (1927).
43. See note 21 supra.
44. Kauper, supra note 20, at 183.
45. Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
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to raise commerce barriers than state taxes, no matter how designated, not
so limited.
Outer limits of the State Taing Power.-The principal problem a
state faces in taxing motor vehicles is a proper distribution of the tax
burden between interstate and domestic traffic. 46 The amount of wear
and tear which each type of traffic causes the highways is capable at best of
only the roughest approximation. Allocation of tax responsibility for
highway damage caused by natural forces is equally incapable of exact
measurement. 47 In the light of these difficulties the Supreme Court has
shown commendable patience with state highway tax structures. A state
may levy more than one kind of tax on interstate highway users provided
48
the aggregate is not in excess of compensation for facilities afforded.
Registration fees, gasoline taxes and special carrier taxes may all be
exacted. A state may employ a different method of assessment or tax
basis for interstate and intrastate highway users.49 For example, a state
may tax interstate motor commerce on a mileage basis, and intrastate motor
commerce on a gross receipts basis. A state taxing statute does not discriminate against interstate motor commerce simply because it exempts
some domestic highway users from the plane of its operation.5 ° Thus a
state may exempt private carriers of agricultural commodities, school buses,
etc. from road tax responsibility. Finally, a state may single out particularly
destructive or dangerous highway users, though they be exclusively interstate,5 1 for special taxation. To illustrate, a special licensing fee for "caravanning" automobiles on state highways has been held not to be an unreasonable tax classification. 52
State taxes held invalid have generally been demonstrably overcompensatory for the purpose for which levied. Thus in Ingels v. Morf 53
the proceeds of a special licensing fee imposed on "caravanning" automobiles were shown to be ten times as much as the expenses necessary for
properly policing such caravans. In fact there has been apparently only
one decision not explainable by an application of the compensation doctrine.
In McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc.,54 a state tax measured by
the amount of gasoline in excess of 20 gallons brought into the state for
46. Dissent by Mr. Justice Black in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309
U.S. 176, 184 (1940).
47. Hearings, supra note 1, at 713.
48. Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928).
49. Id. at 251.
50. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932). But cf. Smith
v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
51. Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936).

52. Clark v. Paul Grey, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
U.S. 290 (1937).
53. 300 U.S. 290 (1937).
54. 309 U.S. 176 (1940).

Cf. Ingels v. Modf, 300
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use by the vehicle in the state was held invalid on the "multiple burden"
principle. 55
It is plain then that state taxing ingenuity has not been stifled in its
search for an equitable apportionment of tax responsibility between interstate and domestic highway users. Even if the state taxing methods held
invalid by the Court had been sustained, it is questionable whetlier such
methods would have eased the difficulties that the states have in apportioning tax responsibility between interstate and intrastate commerce. 50

THE STATE STATUTORY PIcTURE
State tax statutes bearing on interstate highway commerce show a
resulting picture of non-uniformity. Basically each state imposes a registration fee based usually on the type or weight of the vehicle and motor
fuel taxes at varying rates per gallon.5T These are commonly referred
to as first structure and second structure taxes. In addition on the springboard of Clark v. Poor5 8 many states have imposed special additional taxes
on carriers,59 commonly called third structure taxes. Broadly categorized
these latter faxes are based on some function of mileage or apportioned
gross receipts of the individual carrier. The majority of the states provide
for allocation of the proceeds to the state highway fund. 60 In the minority
of the states which have no provision for allocation, there is present agitation for legislation requiring allocation."'
Registration fees are seldom duplicated on interstate motor commerce.
Reciprocity agreements invariably free an interstate carrier from having
to pay a registration fee except in its state of domicile. 62 Special carrier
taxes are ordinarily not the subject of reciprowity agreements, and since
55. The multiple burden was the imposition oi the full state gasoline tax on all
gasoline purchased in another state without allowance for the gasoline tax paid in
the other state.
56. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra note 37 did not circumscribe effective state methods of meeting carrier evasion of gasoline taxes by purchasing gasoline for an interstate trip in another state with a low fuel tax. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 58-627 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1948), which requires an interstate carrier to pay the Virginia gasoline tax on all gasoline "nsed in its operation
uithin this State." Credit is allowed on all taxes arising out of purchase of gas
in Virginia.
57. For a survey of state registration fees see INrmtsrATE TRAD BARRERs 67
(U.S. Dep't Commerce 1942). For a study of the tax rate per gallon imposed by
each state see INTERsTATE BARRmIERs To TRUCK TRANSPORTATON 97 (U.S. Dep't

Agric. 1950). See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 1007, 1012.
58. 274 U.S. 554 (1927).
59. REcipRociry BETrwEv STATEs, a handbook published by the American
Trucking Association, Inc., furnishes a complete list of special carrier taxes imposed
by the states. See also INTERSTATE BARREs To TauciC TRANsP0r 0roN,supra
note 57, at 95.
60. "We have 22 States now that have constitutional provisions that all highwayuser taxes shall go into the roads. There are diversions in the other 26 States, which
total about 93 percent of the total taxes, from the highways. That is an average
figure." Hearings, supra note 1, at 1021 (Testimony by Mr. MacDonald, Commissioner of Public Roads).
61. "Road User Tax Diversion," Traffic World; Feb. 25, 1950, p. 20.
62. See note 59 supra.

80

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

these taxes are the nearest approach to an oppressive burden on interstate
commerce, their function in the state highway tax structure has been constantly criticized.6
Taxes Measured by Mileage or Ton-Mileage.--Formulae based. on
a function of mileage or more elaborately ton-mileage are designed to alleviate discrimination among carriers. If both interstate and intrastate
carriers are taxed at the same rate and on the same basis, the danger of
commercial discrimination is seemingly avoided. 64 But in fact only allocation of tax proceeds to highway purposes or state self-interest in not taxing
its own carriers out of existence will keep the tax from being unreasonable
compensation. The result without these restraining influences is a competitive disadvantage to interstate carriers. 65 The ton-mile tax is vigorously
denounced by highway users engaged in commerce as defective in theory
because it penalizes efficiency, 66 inequitable in practice because it is selfassessed, 67 and costly and difficult in administration because it readily
lends itself to evasive practices. 68 Unquestionably in particular instances
it is all of these. On the other hand the mileage and ton-mileage type of
tax can be applied to common carriers, contract carriers and private carriers, thereby eliminating purely commercial discrimination.
In favor of the ton-mile tax it must be said that it was conceived in
necessity. States having such a tax are invariably states domiciling comparatively few motor carriers.6 9 Some form of special carrier tax would
thus seem necessary to allow these states to make up for deficiencies in carrier registration fees.70 Supreme Court approval of the mileage and ton63. E.g.,

THE ToN-MilE TAx, supra

note 17.

64. PUBLIC Ams To DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION, H.R. Doc. No. 159, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 302 (1948) (Report by Mr. B. N. Behling).
65. If an interstate carrier pays more than its share to state highway expenditures, it is suffering a competitive disadvantage in the terms of Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
66. THE TON-MILE TAX, supra note 17, at 16. See, in confirmation, Hearings,
supra note 1, at 1051.
67.

THE

Tor-MtlE TAx, supra note 17, at 12.

68. Id. at 13.
69. For the year 1949 the publication HIGHWAY STATISTICS (U.S. Bureau Public
Roads 1951) gives the following numbers of trucks and tractors registered in mileage
or ton-mileage states. Alabama (150923), Colorado (120684), Florida (168935),
Kansas (195279), Michigan (280949), New Mexico (55336), Oregon (128918),
West Virginia (103963), Wisconsin (221416), Wyoming (37662). The numbers of
registrations of these states is to be compared with California (608833), New York
(463199), Ohio (326538) and Pennsylvania (432,826) and Texas (557832).
70. See note 69, spra. These registrations include both interstate and intrastate
vehicles. There is no available data on the number of registrations per state of
interstate carriers. There is a tendency, however, for interstate operators to register
their vehicles in states imposing low registration fees. Thus, without special carrier
taxes, states having few registrations would have to increase their fees accordingly,
thereby creating a further highway revenue imbalance.
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mileage forms of tax virtually assures their continuation unless Congress
71
intervenes.
Taxtes Measured by a Carier's Receipts.-The other basic kind of
special carrier tax is the tax measured by apportioned gross receipts of the
individual carrier. The growth of this type of tax is attributable to the
fact that when properly apportioned, it usually encounters no difficulty in
the Supreme Court. 72 Of all the special carrier taxes it is the fairest both
in theory and application. In theory a gross receipts tax is an apt measuring device for the value of the facilities offered by a state to the particular
carrier. 73 In application its ready accommodation to apportionment by
mileage precludes any charge that it subjects interstate commerce to a
"multiple burden." 7 4 The principal advantage of the gross receipts tax
over the ton-mile tax is that unlike the latter, it does not penalize the
larger, more efficient vehicle. Its incidence corresponds with the financial
extent of the carrier's business.
The gross receipts tax also has its disadvantages. It is incapable
of application to the interstate private carrier, since a private carrier will
ordinarily have no gross receipts. 75 Its application to all carriers no more
insures that interstate carriers will not pay the way of the private automobile than any other special carrier tax. Finally, a gross receipts tax,
although aptly measuring the value of state facilities to the interstate carrier, only approximates the actual wear that the carrier causes the high76
ways.
Reciprocity Between States.-Although reciprocity agreements between states have virtually eliminated the inequity that an interstate carrier
be forced to pay a registration tax in every route along its itinerary, the
same is not true for third structure taxes.7 7 Every state except Arizona
71. See dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Capitol Greyhound
Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 548 (1950): "Thus, tax formulas dependent on actual
use of the State's highways satisfy the constitutional test [compensation], without
more, since they reflect an obvious relationship between what is demanded and what
is given by the State. Taxes based on miles or ton-miles have encountered no
difficulty here." Id. at 550. There is also support for the ton-mile theory among
students of highway finance. See PUBLIC AIDs TO DOMEsTIc TRANSPORTATION,
supra note 64, at 302 et seq.
72. See, e.g., Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealy, 334 U.S. 653 (1947).
73. Cf. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1057.
74. In Pennsylvania a portion of the registration fee is allowed as a credit
against the gross receipts tax. The state's income from the latter tax was consequently almost nominal. In 1948 gross receipts tax income was only $7000. In
1949, $14,000. HIGHWAY STATISTIcs (U.S. Bureau of Public Roads 1951). The
same was true in California prior to the recent revision of its highway tax law. See
Zettel, supra note 4, at 212.
75. Private carriers broadly defined are those which carry goods owned and
sold by the owner of the vehicle without direct charge for transportation. See
Coggins, The Private Motor Carrier Definition of the Interstate Commerce Act,
19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1950).
76. The carrier of gravel might conceivably pay less than a carrier exclusively
engaged in carrying feathers. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1057.
77. RECIPROCITY BETWEEN STATEs, supra note 59.
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has statutory provisions authorizing. recipricity agreements.7 8 But the
mere existence of legislation enabling reciprocity is no guarantee that
reciprocity (a) will include more than registration fees or (b) wil be
exercised with every other state. Here again it may be observed that the
number of carriers registered in a state will invariably affect that state's
attitude toward reciprocity agreements. 79 Since the industrial states ordinarily are the domiciles of most carriers, there is no mutuality of advantage
if a non-industrial "causeway" state were to enter a full reciprocity agreement with an industrial state which registers a greater number of carriers.
The worst that can be said for present reciprocity is that it is spotty.
To illustrate, a property carrier domiciled in Pennsylvania plying a route
between Pennsylvania and Florida will have the advantage of more or
less reciprocity in every state except South Carolina.80 Except then where
a non-reciprocating state is fortuitously a neceessary "causeway," presence
or absence of reciprocity determines to some degree the channels of interstate highway commerce. While permissive reciprocity could result in
commerce barriers, it must necessarily remain. State road income should
not be determined simply by the number of vehicles registered in it.
Deficiencies of State Taxation.-The one ever present problem confronting the states in their quest for compensation is the equitable apportionment of the tax burden between interstate and intrastate motor transportation.81
Compensation is measurable in terms of total highway
expenditures, but striking a proper apportionment can only be worked out
empirically. 2 Steadily increasing numbers of state highway tax investigatory programs indicate thal the states are conscious of the problem.8
78. Ibid. See also INTERSTATE BAIERs To TRUCK TRANSPORTATION 100 (U.S.
Dep't Agric. 1950).
79. Another factor inhibiting reciprocity is the amount of the highway costs
which the state must bear in absence of sufficient highway user income. Thus,
Rhode Island is not so pressed for highway income as New Mexico simply as a
matter of highway mileage within the state. See HIGHWAY STATISTICS, supra note
66. On the basis of miles of primary road under state control, the states with the
lowest number of truck registrations line up in a reciprocity study as follows:
Arizona (3864 miles-no reciprocity), Nevada (2153-limited reciprocity), New
Mexico (10,108-no reciprocity for special carrier taxes), Wyomng (4507-no
reciprocity for special carrier taxes). On the other hand Delaware (1011), New
Hampshire (1511) and Vermont (1766) have full reciprocity provisions. See HIGHWAY STATisTIcs, supra note 69; RECIPRocrY BEwEEN STATES, supra note 59. The
states with the highest number of carrier registrations, e.g., California (12,626 miles),
New York (14,268), Ohio (16,073), Pennsylvania (12,915), and Texas (31,557)
line up unanimously in the full reciprocity camp.
80. REcIpRocrrY BETwEEN STATES, supra note 59. Since reciprocity agreements
are in a continual flux, the best source of up-to-date information is contained in this
handbook.
81. See note 37 supra and text.
82. Zettel, supra note 4, at 211, 216. There are other factors, notably a recent
trend to subsidize a portion of highway expenditures from state general taxation on
the theory that improved highways enhance all property values. See DEAENG,
AmmxcAN HIGHWAY PoLcY 159 (Brookings Institute 1942).
83. Studies of highway taxation problems have been undertaken by several states
in cooperation with the trucking interests. Hearings, supra note 1, 1065.
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Constant revisions of state taxing statutes indicate that the states are
attempting to solve it. 4 But a problem underlying it appears less likely
of solution. This is the problem of special carrier taxes. The National
Highway Users Conference S°'stands for a policy of registration fees and
gasoline taxes as the extent of effective state taxation. So-called third
structure taxes are considered unnecessary and undesirable. The Conference argues persuasively that these taxes are undesirable, and unquestionably they are. Their principal vice lies in the fact that they inhibit
effective apportionment of tax responsibility between .interstate and intrastate commerce. Given a single basic tax such as a fee for registration of
a vehicle, a comprehensive and approximately correct allocation of tax
responsibility between commercial vehicles and private automobiles can be
worked out on a pure weight scale. Add to that special taxes on carriers,
imposed in varying forms on common carriers, contract carriers and private carriers, and the number of variables becomes so complex as to challenge solution.88
. Unfortunately however, such taxes seem necessary. The state with
few vehicle registrations stands at a disadvantage where, by reciprocity
_agreements. with other states having more registrations, it precludes itself
from exacting registration fees from the vehicles of those other states
which travel its highways. A higher tax imposed on motor fuels would
increase the financial burden of the "causeway" state's resident motorist.
So the special carrier tax measured in terms of a rough approximation of
.extent or manner of use is the arbitrary equalizer.8 7 Thus the one, real,
seemingly incurable deficiency in state taxation of interstate motor commerce lies in a factor that is beyond the ability of the states to control-the
disparity in the number of vehicle registrations among the various states.
THE FEDERAL TENDRIL

It would seem that Congress could not validly declare interstate motor
carriers immune from state taxation. It has been suggested that such
84. Zettel, supra note 4 at 221.
85. Members include such organizations as The American Trucking Ass'n, Inc.,
The National Grange, The American Automobile Ass'n and others.
86. See, however, statement by Mr. MacDonald, Commissioner of Public Roads,
that a combination of taxes lends itself to an equitable tax solution. Hearings, supra
note 1, at 1047.
87. Thus, State A wherein 50,000 trucks are registered enters a reciprocity agreement with State B wherein 100,000 vehicles are registered. By the terms of the
agreement a vehicle registered in State A may use the highway in State B without
payment of State B's registration fee, and vice versa. Twice as many vehicles of
State B could use State A's highways as State A vehicles could use State B's
highways. If the gasoline tax in both States is the same, State A: will not receive
as much income from highway users as State B. The necessity for special carrier
taxes seems clear. Another reason for the existence of third structure taxes is the
inertia of tax structures built around them. States having such taxes show correspondingly lower registration and gas taxes. The special carrier tax has become
so engrained in the tax structure of the states that have them as to be virtually unbudgeable. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1016, 1017. The latter reason is the explanation for gross receipts taxes in Pennsylvania and California, and their relative unproductivity. See note 74 supra.
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action would be condemnation of state property (highways) without mak-

ing compensation, disalUowed by the Fifth Amendment or the doctrine of
coextensiveness of national and state taxing power. 88 However, there
seems to be no constitutional objection to a federal tax imposed on interstate motor carriers in lieu of state taxes, provided that the proceeds of
the federal tax compensate the states for the facilities they provide inter89
state motor commerce. This in brief is the tack of the bill now pending.
It is the purpose of this section to investigate the benefits and disadvantages to be gained from such a tax, using the present bill as a vehicle for
the examination.
Basis of the Tax.-The tax is a pure weight tax annually assessed.90
It attaches to all vehicles at a given rate per hundred pounds. 91 An exception is made of common carriers for hire over regular routes whose
assessment is higher.9 2 The principal advantage of a weight tax is that
it is easily administrable and will not exhaust itself in enforcement. 93
There is conflicting data on whether the weight of a vehicle is in any
practical way a reflection of the wear and tear it causes the highways.9 4
Some students of highway taxation advocate an "increment" theory of
taxation, or a tax assessed in accordance with the scientifically determined
wear and tear a given vehicle in fact causes to the roads.9 5 But although
such a tax seems equitable, its application is highly complex; and when
it is applied, it measures only wear and tear actually attributable to the
motor vehicles themselves. No matter how much or little a given motor
vehicle uses the road it must contribute to defray damages caused by natural
causes.9 6 Besides the increment theory must be rejected for federal ap88. Kauper, State Taxation of Interstate Motor Carriers,32 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18
n. 74 (1933).
89. H.R. 1652.
90. Id. § 1.
91. Id. § 2(a).

92. Id. § 2(b).
93. Commissioner MacDonald in his testimony before the Meyers Committee discussed the results of highway taxation studies made by a few states. Virtually every
method of state taxation based on esoteric formulas was seriously deficient in enforcement because overcomplicated. Theories investigated were (1) the ton' mile,
(2) taxation by increment or differential costs of vehicles and (3) taxation by spacetime (of vehicles on the highways). It is noteworthy that states presently expend
84 million dollars on road tax enforcement. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1009, 1047.
94. Given the "fatigue point" of a particular road (the point at which a certain
weight will cause stress to the road), it has been found that the road will bear
exceedingly frequent travel of light-load vehicles. On the other hand very infrequent
travel by heavy load vehicles will cause rapid wear and tear. At some point then
it becomes uneconomical even to allow a vehicle exceeding a certain weight limit to
use the roads. Hearings, spra note 1, at 1047; DfAm.anG, AmERICA.r HIGHWAY
."
PoLIcy 168 (Brookings Institute 1942).
95. The increment theory, or theory of differential costs, calls for a steeply
graduated highway user tax as a function of vehicle weight and thickness of the
highway.
96. It should be noted that its basic formula is C-=KWn. C is the cost of
building a road capable of withstanding a vehicle of a given weight; W,. the weight of
the vehicle; K, a constant; and n, an empiric. The formula is given in Hearings,
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plication because it utilizes highway thickness as a part of its formula for
ascertaining cost. Variations in highway thickness throughout the fortyeight states would make the increment theory unadministrable in interstate
motor commerce. If the weight tax is not a measure of the damage caused
the road by a particular vehicle, it is at least a reasonable basis on which
97
users should be required to pay for highway expenditures.
Classificatim of Pehicles---Singled out for special treatment under
the bill are "motor vehicles . . . used in the transportation of passengers
or property for hire over regular routes." 98 "Regular routes" as used in
the bill is to be given "the interpretation ascribed to such words by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and state boards or commissions in
issuing certificates and permits." 99 The special treatment of regular
route carriers amounts to a four times greater rate per hundred pounds.' 0 0
Under a separate provision, such carriers are removed from state taxation.101 The reason for this classification is not clear.
The most logical reason for the singling out of regularroute carriers
for an added tax is probably the naive one that since such carriers will be
the principal beneficaries if interstate carriers-for-hire are removed from
the state taxes they may properly be taxed more.10 2 Viewed in this light
the classification still does not make sense. The fault inheres in the
utilization of the "regular route" distinction for any tax purpose.
The practical distinction between regular route and irregular route
carriers is best understood by example. The Interstate Commerce Commission authorizes all carriers under its authority to operate either over
regular routes or irregular routes. 03 Concomitants of regular route operation are, principally, controlled competition and a duty to operate over
specified routes between specified termini. 0 4 Concomitants of irregular
route operation are freedom to use any routes within or along a described
supra note 1, at 1050. This formula would seem to require vehicles rightly paying a

higher tax by virtue of the costs they entail in building stronger highways also to
bear a higher portion of costs entailed by road damages -from natural forces, e.g.,
weather, etc.
97. The research which has resulted in a consciousnness of the damage that
heavier vehicles cause the highways has not been in vain. It has shown what vehicles
should not be on the highways at all. This is not so much of a tax matter as a
regulatory matter. See note 139 infra and text.
98. H.R., 1652, §2(b).
99. Id. § 11.
100. Ibid. The proposed rate is 80 cents per hundred pounds net weight in comparison with 20 cents per hundred pounds on all other vehicles.
101. See note 119 infra and text.
102. Section 8 of the bill purports to relieve "all vehicles used for transporting
passengers or property for hire in interstate commerce" from all additional state taxes.
This designation includes both regular route carriers and irregular route carriers.
See note 112 infra.
103. THE MOTOR CAIER Acr, supra note 3, §§306(a), 307(a), 308.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Maher, 307 U.S. 148 (1939) ; United States v.
Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 478 (1942).
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area, and total absence of schedule. 10 5 In practice, however, it has been
observed that there is a natural tendency for irregular route carriers to
gravitate into regular route carriers. After the path of business is pounded
down, the irregular route carrier cleaves to the same path, observing as
much regularity as his patrons wish. The result is unauthorized and perhaps destructive competition with an authorized regular route operator.10 6
When an irregular route operator has gravitated into too much of a regular
°
route operator he will be enjoined or penalized.1 7
The classic distinction between regular routes and irregular routes.
for the purpose of determining whether an irregular route carrier exceeds
its bounds is stated in Tran:sportationActivities, Brady Traimfer Co.'08
The distinction is drawn by a series of criteria, specifically eight, by the
application of which a board of commission may determine, not without
difficulty, whether an irregular route carrier has gravitated into so much
of a regular route carrier as to have exceeded the authority conferred upon
him by his certificate.' 0 9 As a policing measure among carriers, these
criteria are far-sighted and comprehensive, but as the basis for a tax
classification, their application would make for discriminations among virtual equals. It is undisputed that there exist irregular route carriers indistinguishable from regular route carriers except by a close application
of the Brady criteria." 0 Obviously then regular route carriers will not
be the principal beneficiaries if interstate motor carriers are freed from
multi-state taxes. Irregular route carriers plying interstate routes will
also benefit."' A tax'distinction between such carriers is unwarranted.
Under the present bill, contract carriers and private carriers doing
an interstate business are left subject to state taxation. 112 Again the reason
is not clear, for entry by Congress in the field could render a great service
to interstate motor commerce which is beyond the power of the states to
effect. Congress by entering the field could remove entirely the third
105. Ibid.
106. Transportation Activities, Brady Transfer & Storage Co., 47 M.C.C. 23, 39,
40 (1947).
107. THE MOTOR CARRIER Act, supra note 3, § 312(a).
108. 47 M.C.C. 23 (1947).
109. Id. at 28. The criteria are: "(1) operation according to a predetermined
plan or outline, (2) the movement in significant amounts of particular types of
traffic, (3) the vigorous solicitation of this particular type of traffic and the holding out of particular types of service, (4) the maintenance at significant points of
terminals, (5) the habitual use of certain (fixed) routes, (6) operation between
fixed termini, (7) a marked or constant periodicity in the service given, and (8) the
observance of definite or published schedules or their equivalent."
110. Id. at 53.
111. Section 8 of the bill forecloses state taxation of "all vehicles used for transporting passengers or property for hire in interstate commerce." (Emphasis added).
In this category fall both regular route and irregular route carriers. Even if the
bill be amended so as to foreclose state taxation of regular route carriers only, the
administrative line drawing necessary to enforce such a tax would be insurmountable.
See note 109 supra and text.
112. The classification "for hire" would exclude contract carriers and private
carriers. See THE MOToR CARRIER Act, supra note 3, § 303(a) (14), (15), (17).
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structure taxes which are the greatest stumbling block to effective state
taxation. Third structure taxes attach to all interstate carriers and are
a practical necessity in view of the disparity of numbers of carriers registered per state.113 Were Congress to affix a sufficiently high rate per
hundred pounds on alt interstate carriers, the proceeds of such a tax could
effectively compensate those states currently at a disadvantage with respect
to income from carrier registrations." 4 The practical difficulties of administering such a tax are not insurmountable. It may be undesirable
to tax purely intrastate carriers to the same extent as interstate. Intrastate carriers would then be taxed at the federal base rate leaving any
special adjustment to the state of domicile."r 5
A further tax classification proposed by the bill is an additional tax,
of five cents per mile actually travelled over the highway imposed on
vehicles of a gross weight of more than fifty-eight thousand pounds.'"'
Since this special provision applies to all motor vehicles there is no risk
of discrimination among motor carriers, except as it affects operators whose
carriage is geared to over fifty-eight thousand pound loads.
Although the figure conforms approximately to the maximum loading
provisions of most state highway laws," 7 the arbitrary nature of the provision raises problems within the realm of carrier regulation. These will
be examined in the following section.
Relief from Non-Uniform State Taxes.-The bill's salutary feature
lies in the relief it affords interstate highway commerce from non-uniform
state taxes. Each vehicle is still to be licensed by the state in which the
vehitle is domiciled, for the Commissioner (in whose lap enforcement of
the tax falls) is authorized to accept "for the purposes of this Act the net
weights shown upon the licenses issued by the state in which the vehicle
may be domiciled." 18 The relief from non-uniform state taxes other than
the registration tax in the state of domicile is provided for in the next
succeeding section:
"Any ana all vehicles used for transporting passengers or property for hire in interstate commerce when properly licensed in a
State and lawfully displaying an identification tax plate as provided
for in this Act, shall be exempt from any and all other fees, charges,
requirements, or restraints imposed by local, State or Federal author113. See note 79 s4upra.
114. This does not mean that Congress should take over the status quo and be
the mere collection agent for states having special carrier taxes. Congress' disbursement of the funds should have greater significance and purpose. See note 149
infra and text.
115. Thus purely intrastate carriers would pay the rate of 20 cents per hundred
pounds. Since they are the main users of state secondary roads, their state tax
assessment should be geared to the costs of upkeep of the roads they use.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 1025. DzA1NG, op. cit., upra note 82, at 170.

See

116. H.R. 1652, §2(b).
117. A majority of the states have gross weight maximums of considerably less
231 (1943).
then 58000 pounds. THaE MOTOR TRUcK REDBPoo,
118. H.R. 1652, § 7.
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ity in the same manner and to the same extent as now provided in
§ 5(11) (Ch. 1, title 48[49?] U. S. C.): Provided, That the gross
weight of the vehicle or combination of vehicles with load does not
exceed 58,000 pounds: Provided further, that no vehicle shall be exempted from local traffic laws, regulations, uniform tolls or sales
taxes." 119
Exemption from any and all other fees, charges, etc

....

to the same

extent as now provided in § 5(11) with subsequent provisos seems to
contemplate only limited entry by Congress into the field of taxation of
interstate motor commerce. But what entry there is defies definition.
Section 5(11) vests the Interstate Commerce Commission with plenary
power in the consolidation or merger of carriers. It was framed essentially to assuage any doubts that an I. C. C. sanctioned consolidation might
conflict with State or Federal anti-trust laws. For jthis purpose § 5(11)
is explicit and unequivocal.1 20 But as an omnibus for miscellaneous entry
by Congress into any area of interstate cgmmerce, § 5 (11) is not susceptible
of exact meaning when simply incorporated by reference. Particular
clauses, understandable when viewed in the light of the primary mission
of § 5 (11) must be strained to accommodate the intended degree of Congress' entry into the taxing field. 2 The degree of entry in fact is suspended in mid-air. Many questions are left unanswered. Are carriers
licensed in accordance with the bill to be free from compliance with regulations of State Public Utilities Commissions? 122 Is § 202(c) of the
119. Id. § 8.
120. The relevant provisions of § 5(11) are:
"The authority conferred by this section shall be exclusive and plenary, and
any carrier or corporation participating in or resulting from any transaction approved
by the Commission thereunder, shall have full power . . . to carry such transaction
into effect and to own and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such transaction without invoking any approval under State
authority; and any carriers or other corporations, and their officers and employees
and any other persons, participating in a transaction approved or authorized under
the provisions of this section shall be and they are relieved from the operation of the
antitrust laws, and of all other restraints,limitations, and prohibitionsof law, Federal,
State or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect
the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms, and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission . . . Nothing in this section shall be
construed to create or provide for the creation, directly or indirectly, of a Federal
Corporation, but any power granted by this section to any carrier or other corporation shall be deemed to be in addition to and in modification of its powers under its
corporate charter or under the laws of any State." (Emphasis added.)
121. Thus: "Any carrier so licensed under this Act . . . shall have full power
. . . to . . . exercise any control or franchises acquired through such transaction without invoking any approval under State authority; and . . . shall be and
they are relieved from the operation of . . . all other restraints, limitations, and
prohibitions of law, Federal, State or Municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transactionso approved . . ." (Emphasis added).
Cases under this section naturally involve mergers. See, e.g., Seaboard R. Co. v.
Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948). They would be of no help to iron out in advance
practical problems in the taxing field.
122. Under existing law in almost every state, common carriers must secure
certificates, and contract carriers permits, from the State Public Utilities Commission. WAGNER, op. cit. suipra note 3, at 46, 47 n. 104-106. How the plenary clause of
the bill would affect existing law is an unanswerable.
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Motor Carrier Act 123 repealed insofar as it has been construed to permit
state regulation of the sizes and weights of vehicles to be allowed on the
highways? 124 Can a state exact gasoline taxes from interstate carriers?
No straightforward answer can be given in view of the indefiniteness of
the provision. It is an open invitation to litigation.
The provisos, however, are explicit enough. In the first place vehicles
whose gross weight exceeds 58,000 pounds are to be divested of interstate
immunity from taxation afforded other carriers under the bill. 12 The
arbitrary nature of this figure is not unreasonable for the imposition of
an additional mileage tax,1 27 but if 58,000 pounds is to be regarded as the
new maximum loading for interstate commerce it will in its nature displace
former state loading requirements necessarily geared to the physical condition of state roads.128 In other words 58,000 pounds may be more than
the highways of some states will withstand. Thus an arbitrary weight
limit imposed by Congress will work hardship in an area of interstate
commerce which requires flexible regulation. 29 Here, if anywhere, large
discretion should be lodged in a Commission to ascertain and impose this
extra-revenue aspect of the bill. 30
In the second place local traffic laws and regulations will properly
remain in force. 13 1 In addition uniform tolls for roads and sales taxes
will continue to be exacted.' 3 2 Continuation of tolls is not a hardship on
interstate commerce, because toll facilities are invariably the product of
bond issues which indirectly allow highway users .to participate in the
development of highways. 13 Nor can fault be found with the continuation

'2.

123. 49

STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1946).
124. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)
(state regulations limiting the weight and width of interstate vehicles held valid).
See note 126 infra and text. If 58,000 pounds is to be the new maximum weight
limit, the question must be answered in the negative.
125. Unless gasoline taxes are to be included in the second proviso of § 8 it
would appear that another question is left unanswered.
126. H.R. 1652, § 8: "Provided, That the gross weight of the vehicle or combination of vehicles does not exceed fifty-eight thousand pounds."
127. See note 117 spra.
128. Most states regulate the weight of vehicles using the roads on an "axle load"
basis. Usually the maximum axle load is 18,000 pounds. Thus a five axle truck
weighing over 58,000 pounds would be allowed to use the highways. But a two axle
truck weighing 58,000 pounds would never be allowed on the highways. Hearings,
supra note 1, at 970. If Congress should ever take over control of maximum vehicle
weight requirements, as this bill purports to do, a pure "gross weight" limitation
would be unsuitable.
129. There are other factors militating against uniformity of vehicle weight
limitations. Road depth is such a factor. State-to-state variance here is prohibitive
of uniform fiat. Hearings, supra note 1, at 959.
130. There is some undue state tenderness for roads manifested in weight restrictions. In the interest of a national motor-commerce, it would be desirable to have
national control over state weight restrictions. INTERSTATE BARRas To TRucK

TRANSPORTATION

22 (U.S. Dep't Agric. 1950).

131. H.R. 1652, § 8.
132. Ibid.
133. Proceeds of the tolls are used to service the bond issues which subscribe
capital for roadbuilding. For a critical analysis of this method of highway finance
see Zettel, supra note 4, at 212.
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of state exaction of sales taxes on vehicles, since they are imposed on the
sale of vehicles and spare parts as part of the scheme of general state
taxation. 8 4
It is submitted that the degree of Congress' entry in the field of taxation of interstate motor commerce should be spelled out unequivocally.
Of course this is necessarily a question of what Congress could do to
advantage in the field. And since the principal reason for Congress to
enter is the elimination of third-structure state taxes in an equitable fashion,
no compelling reason presents itself why Congress should not make this
the extent of its entry. 8 5 The extra-revenue impact of a comprehensive
tax should also when coupled with a proper remitter 186 (1) eliminate
third structure taxes, 87 (2) provide continued state income from registration and gasoline taxes 138 and (3) subject state maximum-loading requirements to the authority of an impartial Commission.'8 "
Remitter of Tax Proceeds.-The bill contemplates disbursement of
tax proceeds as follows: ". . one-half thereof to be paid into the general
fund in the United States Treasury and the remaining one-half shall be
paid to the treasurers of the several states, apportioned according to the
relative number of miles of improved roads in each State, respectively." 140
The vice of this provision is the apportionment among the states. Since
the funds are not earmarked and may be used for any appropriation once
in the state treasury, there is no method of even approximating the amount
contributed to the state to the amount expended for highway purposes.
A state with beautiful, infrequently used highways will receive too much.
A state with highways subject to hard use, a state harboring the arteries
of motor commerce, will often not receive enough.' 41 Further the cost
of constructing highways depends largely on the geography of the state.142
134. They fall properly under the heading of general taxation. Kauper, supra
note 20, at 12.
135. See note 149 infra.
136. See note 149 infra and text.
137. Special carrier or third-structure taxes would not be the only taxes eliminated by a provision denying states the right to tax carriers as a special class. An
interstate carrier licensed under this act would not have to pay registration fees in
any other state except the state of domicile. In other words, the act would displace
all reciprocity agreements simply by eradicating the need for them. See note 79
mipra. Equally important, carrier bookkeeping requirements necessitated by third
structure taxes would be eliminated.
138. Gasoline taxes, and special diesel fuel taxes are not levied on carriers as a
special tax. An argument might be made that diesel fuel is used only by some classes
of carriers, but such taxes are levied in lieu of gasoline taxes. INTERSTATE BARu~s
To TRucKc TRANSPORTATION, supra note 130, at 101.
139. Unquestionably Commission control of state highway loading requirements
is long overdue. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1073. (Statement by the American Association of State Highway Officials).
140. H.R. 1652, § 8 (Emphasis added).
141. During the depression years many states extended their improved surface
road in an effort to alleviate unemployment. As a cold matter of transportation fact
such extension was unwarranted. DEAaiNG, op. cit. mpra note 82, at 160.
142. Ibid.
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Periodicity and cost of maintenance turn on the same factor.' 43 Regulatory expenses vary according to the population and geography, and here
again a legitimate expense varying widely between states is tied to a factor
having scant relation to the amount expended. 144
There is at least one satisfactory answer to the problem. It can be
expressed in terms of what Congress can do to best advantage in the
highway finance field. Since 1916, the federal government has subsidized
state road building under the Federal-Aid Road Program 45 The interests served were the national defense and a national system of highways.' 46 As more and more miles of state highways were added to the
federal system, the federal investment increased proportionally until today
it requires an annual appropriation of a half billion dollars.14 7 Up to the
present time no effort has been made to shunt the federal burden back
upon the users, which would be a natural thing in view of the benefit
theory of highway taxation so long adhered to by the states and sanctioned
by the Supreme Court.14s In the furtherance of a national commerce it
would not be precipitate to affix the primary users of the interstate highway system with the financial responsibility for its maintenance. 149 Thus
revenues collected from interstate carriers should be remitted to the states
in proportion to the costs of maintaining the federal system of highways. 3 0
CONCLUSION

State taxation of interstate motor commerce can never be fully effective
or equitable as long as it maintains the third-structure tax. But as indicated earlier, third-structure taxes are a practical necessity for reasons
beyond the power of states to remedy. Such taxes are economically business taxes, and compensation taxes only in the sense that their proceeds
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. For a history of the federal aid program, see
82, at 181; DEARING AND

OWEN,

DEARING,

op. cit. supra note
POLICY 105-114

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

(Brookings Institute 1949).
146. DEARING, op. cit. supra note 82, at 180.
147. DEARING AND OWEN, op. cit. mtpra note 145, at 111.
148. See note 15 supra.
149. The national highway system includes 234,486 miles of the total 357,650
miles of state primary highways. HIGHw y STATISTcS (U.S. Bureau of Public
Roads 1951). The primary users of this system and those for whom it was conceived are interstate motor carriers. DEAING, op. cit. supra note 82; at 170. It
seems only fair that these primary users should as a class assume the financial responsibility of its upkeep.
150. Each state has some highways which are a part of the federal system. Continued state contributions would be demanded to some extent. This contribution
should come from those intrastate highway users who enjoy the facilities equally with
interstate carriers. DEARING, op. cit. supra note 82 at 170.
This of course leaves a great part of the state highway system dependent on
revenues collected from intrastate users. -But it has been demonstrated that local
users are the particular beneficiaries of these secondary state roads and should bear
the financial responsibilities therefor. DEARING, op. cit. supra note 82, at 172.
Finally, an even greater system of state roads, designated as "land-access" roads,
would receive no user revenues at all. This is an economically sound result, for
this system of roads should be maintained by local taxation of property owners who
benefit thereby. DEARING, op. cit. supra note 82, at 172.

92

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

equalize/the tax disadvantage of states domiciling comparatively few carriers. It is this economic fallacy on which third-structure taxes are sustained in the Supreme Court and continued by the states that will lead to
Congress' entering the field of taxation of interstate commerce.
Only partial entry by Congress is needed. The abolition of thirdstructure taxes will leave the states in a position to adjust the tax burden
of developing and maintaining the highways in an equitable way between
interstate motor commerce and domestic vehicles. At the same time the
revenues collected from the higher tax on interstate motor carriers can
be employed to advantage in the maintenance and extension of the federal
system of highways, thereby relieving the states from considerable financial responsibility. An effective state tax structure would then include
income from the registration fees of vehicles licensed by it and liquid-fuel
taxes from all highway users, interstate and domestic. In addition interstate motor commerce might then be required to pay the normal business
privilege tax exacted from all domesticated interstate corporations. The
latter tax, however, invokes a question of how far the concept of "doing
business" is to be extended. 15 1
The present bill is seriously deficient with respect to the advaniages
to be derived from Congress' entering the field. Too little thought was
given to the practical needs of an interstate motor commerce. When
Congress does enter the field, it should do so explicitly, not by way of a
bill designed in the first place for revenue and only secondarily for the
salvation of interstate commerce. The cause of entry into the field should
not be sacrificed to other considerations.
Joseph P. Flanagan,Jr..

MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN PENNSYLVANIACHECKERED IMMUNITY
According to the best doctrinal restatements of Pennsylvania law, a
municipal corporation is liable for the negligence of its servants only when
they are engaged in the proprietary or business activities of the corporation. It is not liable for the negligence of employees or officers who perform governmental functions for the corporation. These very general
statements, which accord with the usual American view, must be the
theoretical elements of any Pennsylvania decision on municipal tort liability.' Legal writers have universally condemned the escape from tort
liability by governmental units, national, state, and local, as an undesirable
anachronism built on false logic. Professor Borchard has provided a
151. Weinstock, Why Exempt Interstate Commerce, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 613
(1951).
1. Hartness v. Allegheny County, 349 Pa. 248, 37 A.2d 18 (1944); Scibilia v.
See 18 McVCQOrILLI, MUNICIPAL
Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 AUt. 273 (1924).
CoRwoRATIoNs §§ 53.01-53.05 (3d ed. 1950).
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consummate devastation of the theory of governmental immunity,2 and
there have been recurring discussions of the irregularities and impracticalities of the subsidiary rules. 3 Yet the courts, particularly those of
Pennsylvania, have been unmoved by this persistent criticism. Although
.preservation of the condemned features of the system of tort liability of
municipal corporations may be attributed to the underlying theories and
the operation of stare decisis, it appears that many of the inequities of the
system are traceable to the erratic case by case development of this field
of law.
HISTORiC ANTECEDENTS
Nothing is seen of the governmental-corporate distinction in the early
Pennsylvania cases. The judges seem to have felt their way along with
the aid of the few decided cases in other jurisdictions and without the benefit
of any guiding theory.4 Although the principles of sovereign immunity to
tort liability were known to early legal writers 5 and had been employed
in Pennsylvania,0 they were not articulated as a basis for withholding
tort liability from municipal corporations. The consistent absence of the
now familiar labels, corporate or governmental, indicates strongly that
this differentiation was unknown in the formative years in Pennsylvania.
In the earliest attempts to fasten tort liability upon local governmental
units in Pennsylvania, plaintiffs alleged injury to their property from
adjacent road construction. They were rebuffed, apparently on the ground
that a city's authority to build streets carried with it a justification for
consequential damage to abutting properties.' In this there seems to have
been the thought that the public need outweighed the private disadvantage.
Statutory Duty and Agency.-In 1843 the supreme court first approved municipal tort responsibility in Justice Rogers' opinion holding a
township liable for an injury caused by the poor condition of a highway.8
The reasoning of this influential decision deserves close study. A statute
imposed upon the township supervisors a duty to maintain and repair the
2. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE LJ. 1, 757, 1039

(1926).

3. Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAw & CoN= P. PROB. 214 (1942).
4. The early English cases cited disclosed no special rules for municipal corporations. Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, 1 Cowp. 86, 98 Eng. Rep. 980 (1774), held the
corporation liable for failure to maintain the navigability of a stream. In Russell v.
Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788), the residents of a county were
absolved of liability because they were unincorporated and there was no fund from
which a judgment could be paid; the court refused to allow a judgment which could
be satisfied by execution against a selected few. New York and Massachusetts cases
referred to were no greater help at this time.
5. 1 BL. CoMm. 241-243 (4th ed. 1770).
6. Black v. Rempublicam, 1 Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792). The theory is unchanged:
Collins v. Commonwealth, 262 Pa. 572, 106 Atl. 229 (1919).
7. Green v. Reading, 9 Watts 382 (Pa. 1840); Mayor v. Randolph, 4 W. & S.
514 (Pa. 1842). This result was superseded by the Constitution of 1874: Chester
County v. Brower, 117 Pa. 647, 12 Atl. 577 (1888).
8. Dean v. New Milford Township, 5 W. & S. 545 (Pa. 1843).
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roads within the township. It was found that the supervisors has failed
properly to do so. Justice Rogers then declared that the supervisors were
the township's agents and that their principal should be liable for their
negligence.9 This simple reasoning augured well for an uncomplicated
future in this field. It was followed in decisions relating to streets, highways, bridges, navigable rivers and sidewalks.' 0 It was extended in a
few decisions based on the existence of a duty which arose with the
Soon,
municipality's assumption of control of a particular activity."
however, it was hedged by exceptions: the statutory duty was found to
2
be essential and the duty had to be mandatory rdther than discretionary.'
Where the statute gave only authority, the absence of imperative language
was decisive.' 3 Finally, when confronted with mandatory statutes concerning the schools and fire and police departments, the courts condemned
the statutory duty rule and refused to extend it beyond the decided cases.' 4
Today the rule is significant as the origin of a large segment of tort liability which cannot be explained by the modem formulation. But it is not
interred: cases involving highway maintenance may still turn upon the
15
words of the appropriate statute.
Another premise in Justice Rogers' reasoning-that supervisors are
agents of the township--has been an independent basis for decision., One
of the earliest cases turned upon the disputed agency of a policeman.' 7
In a later case the city was not liable for the negligence of the city surveyor because he was elected, not subject to removal by the municipal
authorities, and therefore not a servant of the city.' 8 How the surveyor's
status differed from that of elected supervisors was not discussed; it is
apparent that the court avoided a difficult task. Other cases, which absolve
the municipalities of liability on the ground that the alleged agent was an
independent contractor, indicate the continued necessity of establishing
the agency relationship. 19 In more recent years the courts have, perhaps
9. Id. at 546.
10. Erie City v. Schwingle, 22 Pa. 384 (1853) (street); Humphreys v. Armstrong County, 56 Pa. 204 (1867) (bridge); Winpenny v. Philadelphia, 65 PA. 135
(1870) (navigable stream) ; Rapho Township v. Moore, 68 Pa. 404 (1871) (bridge) ;
Gehringer v. Lehigh County, 231 Pa. 497, 80 Atl. 987 (1911); McCormick v.
Allegheny County, 263 Pa. 146, 106 Atl. 203 (1919).
11. Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. 54 (1853) (wharf) ; Weber v. Harrisburg, 216
Pa. 117, 64 Atl. 905 (1906) (park).
12. Munn v. Pittsburgh, 40 Pa. 364 (1861) ; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. 420 (1871) ;
Lehigh County v. Hoffort, 116 Pa. 119, 9 Atl. 177 (1887).
13. Ibid.
14. Ford v. Kendall Borough School District, 121 Pa. 543, 15 Atl. 812 (1888) ;
Cousins v. Butler, 73 Pa. Super. 86 (1919); Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549,
124 Atl. 273 (1924) ; Szilagyi v. Bethelehem, 312 Pa. 260, 167 Atl. 782 (1933).
15. Clark v. Allegheny County, 260 Pa. 199, 103 Atl. 552 (1918) ; Brunacci v.
Plains Township, 315 Pa. 391, 173 AtI. 329 (1934).
16. Dean v. New Milford Township, 5 W. & S. 545, 546 (Pa. 1843).
17. Fox v. The Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841).
18. Alcorn v. Philadelphia, 44 Pa. 348 (1863).
19. Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. 213 (1863) ; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Allegheny
County, 324 Pa. 216, 188 Atl. 178 (1936).
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under the influence of the early cases, inserted a confusing mechanical
phrase in their opinions: the writer will say that a function is corporate
or governmental and that, accordingly, respondeat superior does or does
not apply.20 This usage is, at best, carelessness. Whether or not respondeat superior applies would seem to have no relation to the label
applied to the activity in which an employee is engaged. The masterservant status is determined by other well known factors. 21 Nonliability
may arise either from want of agency or from application of the governmental label or from both causes; but the statement that there is a causal
relationship between these sources of nonliability is inaccurate. That the
tort-feasor be the servant of the municipal corporation is, however, still
essential to establishing liability.
The Governmental-CorporateDichotomy.-The origin of the current
dogma is not clear. A distinction between different 'types of functions of
municipal corporations was apparently first drawn with regard to a contract made by a city. 22 It was decided that the city could not avoid a
contract to supply gas because such contract was made in the corporation's private capacity and for the purpose of private advantage and emolument.

2
The distinction here was between public and private powers. 3

Subsequently, the operation of gas, water and electric systems was considered to be a private function and the maintenance of polling places and
courthouses to be public.2 4 At about this stage of development the courts
began to use the terms "governmental" and "corporate." 25 Whether
these terms were borrowed from other jurisdictions is not apparent; it
is not unlikely that Judge Dillon's treatise on municipal corporations was
heavily influential in the choice of terminology.2 6 These terms descended
to form the dressing of the modern rule, the validity of which seems never
to have been questioned in the courts. If it be assumed that the Commonwealth enjoys sovereign immunity to tort liability, and that municipal corporations perform certain functions as the agents of the Commonwealth,
it is reasonable to conclude that municipal corporations should partake
20. E.g., Hartness v. Allegheny County, 349 Pa. 248, 250, 37 A.2d 18 (1944) ;
Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 553, 124 Atl. 273 (1924); Ford v. Kendall
Borough School District, 121 Pa. 543, 15 Atl. 812 (1888).
21. RESTATEmENT, AGENCY §220 (1933).
22. Western S. F. Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175, 182 (1854).
23. Ibid. See also Western S. F. Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 185, 189
(1858).
24. Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. 41 (1884) (gas); Philadelphia v. Gilmartin,
71 Pa. 140 (1872) (water) ; Bodge v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 492, 31 Atl. 728 (1895)
(electricity) ; Hubbard v. Crawford County, 221 Pa. 438, 70 Atl. 805 (1908) (polls) ;
Bucher v. Northumberland County, 209 Pa. 618, 59 Atl. 69 (1904) (courthouse).
25. An early mention of "corporate" is found in Lower Macungie Township v.
Merkhoffer, 71 Pa. 276 (1872). Subsequently sporadic use of either or both of the
terms appeared. The modern rule is stated in its present form in Kelley v. Cumberland County, 229 Pa. 289, 78 Atl. 276 (1910).
Generally, governmental functions
are those traditionally performed by the state alone and corporate functions are those
very often performed by private enterprise.
26. judge Dillon's first edition was published in 1872. This and subsequent editions of his work are frequently cited in Pennsylvania cases.
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of the same immunity as to these "governmental" functions. 27 The failure
to note these assumptions in the early opinions indicates strongly that the
modern rule is in reality only an attempted rationalization of the decided
cases and not the precise formula that it purports to be. It may be that
many of the haphazard results are due to the fact that this is a rationalization. Whether rationalization or misguided logic, this is the stated
rule.
Quasi-Municipal Corporations.--Duringthe development of the foregoing doctrines, the courts discovered a subsidiary line of reasoning which
was advanced in support of a number of decisions and is now accepted as
a part of the law. This reasoning distinguished between municipal corporations proper and quasi-municipal corporations as to their tort responsibility. Municipal corporations proper normally include cities and
boroughs; quasi-municipal corporations are counties, townships and school
districts. 28 The rule states that, since quasi-municipal corporations are
simply political subdivisions of the state, they are "largely invested with
the same immunity" as the state.29 Allowing for the expressed limitation
in the rule, this language should at the minimum mean that there are
certain areas in which municipal corporations are liable and quasi-municipal
corporations are not. Moreover, since municipal corporations proper are
theoretically liable only with respect to corporate functions, the courts
must mean that quasi-municipal corporations escape liability even as to
some corporate functions. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that
quasi-municipal corporations actually do have smaller areas of liability.
School districts enjoy a blanket immunity to tort liability.30 Counties and
townships appear to be subject to liability only with regard to roads,
bridges, sidewalks, parks and, under certain circumstances, the maintenance
of public buildings.3 1 There are, of course, a number of other instances
32
in which cities and boroughs have been held liable.
Aside from the singular position of the school districts, the strongest
support for this position comes from two cases. In Bucher v. North27. The validity of the first assumption has been sharply attacked. Borchard,
supra note 2.
28. 1 McQuTLTN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs §§ 2.04, 2.05, 2.07, 2.13 (1949).
Differentiation between classes of local government could become highly complex
in view of the intricate organization in Pennsylvania. See Phillips, Legal Position of
Local Units of Government it; Pennsylvania, 13 TEMp. L.Q. 466 (1939).
29. Hartness v. Allegheny County, 349 Pa. 248, 251, 37 A.2d 18, 19 (1944).
See Bucher v. Northumberland County, 209 Pa. 618, 59 Atl. 69 (1908). This, too,
was a belated judicial discovery not reflected in early opinions; see Vankirk v. Clark
and Graham, 16 S. & R. (Pa. 1827); Kittaning Academy v. Brown, 41 Pa. 269
(1861). For general discussion, see 18 McQuILLIX, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs § 53.05
(1950).
30. Ford v. Kendall Borough School District, 121 Pa. 543, 15 Atl. 812 (1888);
Brinton v. School District of Shenango, 81 Pa. Super. 456 (1923).
31. Gehringer v. Lehigh County, 231 Pa. 497, 80 Atl. 987 (1911) (bridge);
Clark v. Allegheny County, 260 Pa. 199, 103 Atl. 552 (1918) (road) ; McCormick
v. Allegheny County, 263 Pa. 146, 106 AtI. 203 (1919) (sidewalk); Onstott v.
Allegheny County, 338 Pa. 206, 12 At. 785 (1940) (park-reversed on other
grounds). As to public buildings, see cases discussed at notes 33 to 39 infra.
32. See cases cited in notes 46 to 48 infra.
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umberland County, a county was not liable for an injury occasioned by a
fall on the icy sidewalk in front of a county courthouse; I cities are liable
for such injuries in many cases.34 In Hartness v. Allegheny County, a
county was not liable for an injury caused by the cascading of a mass of
snow from the roof of a courthouse;8 5 a city has been liable for the negligent maintenance of a fire-house door which swung abruptly into the street
and injured a passerby 8 6 and for the negligent operation of an elevator
in a city hall.3 7 The contrasting results obtained on analogous fact situations tend to establish the validity of the distinction between the types of
municipal corporations. However, in the one case in which this distinction might have been clarified beyond doubt, it was ignored. In Bell v.
Pittsburgh,plaintiff was injured by the negligent operation of an elevator
in the city-county building; the supreme court affirmed his recovery against
both the city and the county.38 This case seems difficult to distinguish
from the Hartnesscase, but Justice Stern did so in the latter decision and,
in so doing, revealed the true basis of the distinction between municipal and
quasi-municipal corporations: in the Hartness case the predominant activities in the courthouse were governmental and, therefore, the county
was not liable.3 9 The talk about the lesser liability of quasi-municipal corporations reduces then to the proposition that the activities of a county or
township are predominantly governmental and, as such, are not sources
of liability. A close examination of the cases reveals that, with but one
exception, 40 each decision which has alluded to the special status of quasicorporations has also found the activity involved to be governmental. 4'
This theoretical reduction is borne out by the facts. The limited
activities of quasi-municipal corporations are dwarfed beside the big business of cities and boroughs.4 Quasi-municipal corporations provide fewer
44
services for their residents," devote much less land to corporate use.
33. 209 Pa. 618, 59 Atl. 69 (1904).
34. The cases are legion. For detailed discussion see Rosenblum, Pennsylvania
Negligence Law and Procedure,288 INs. L.J. 3, 6 (1947) ; Sahm, Municipal Liability
in Pennsylvania for Defective Streets, 45 DicK. L. REv. 113 (1941).
35. 349 Pa. 248, 37 A.2d 18 (1944).
36. Kies v. Erie City, 169 Pa. 598, 32 Atl. 621 (1895).
37. Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 Atl. 356 (1904).
38. 297 Pa. 185, 146 AUt. 567 (1929).
39. Hartness v. Allegheny County, 349 Pa. 248, 252, 37 A.2d 18, 20 (1944).
40. Bucher v. Northumberland County, 209 Pa. 618, 59 Atl. 69 (1904), the classic
case on quasi-municipal corporations, makes no mention of governmental or corporate
functions.
41. E.g., Hubbard v. Crawford County, 221 Pa. 438, 70 Atl. 805 (1908);
Balashaitis v. Lackawanna County, 296 Pa. 83, 145 Atl. 691 (1929); Shenk v. Erie
County, 319 Pa. 100, 178 Atl. 662 (1935).
42. During 1945 municipal corporations in Pennsylvania received $181,533,740,
spent $163,234,799; quasi-corporations received only $82,710,515, spent $61,892,251.
LocAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES

IN

PENNSYLVANIA

10, 13-G (Pa. Dep't Int. Affairs

1945).
43. E.g., of the 408 municipally owned utilities, 348 are operated by cities and
boroughs, 9 by townships, and 51 by authorities (the majority in boroughs). Id.
at 112-119.
44. Most parks, auditoriums, parking lots, etc., are city owned. Monetarily, the
contrast is clear: Philadelphia's rental receipts for 1945 were $3,681,996; for the
same year all 67 counties received only $388,980 from rent and interest combined.
Id. at 25, 42.
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4
Such functions as they do perform are almost wholly governmental. 5
Hence, it seems safe to conclude that their lesser liability is simply a statement of fact and has not arisen because they partake of an added portion
of the state's immunity.

DECISIONAL TOPOGRAPHY

One hundred years of decision making have established certain areas
in which the tort liability of municipal corporations is fairly well settled.
There seems to be no question that municipalities are liable for injuries
arising from the improper maintenance of streets, bridges and sidewalks. 46
Cases involving defective or icy sidewalks and streets are undoubtedly
the most numerous and usually turn upon questions of negligence rather
than upon the theory of liability.4 7 Responsibility for negligent operation
of municipally owned utilities was apparently put to rest long ago; it has
not been a subject of recent decisions. 48 The modem trend has been to
place the ownership of utilities in municipal authorities and to carry insurance against injuries.
Early cases which, on different grounds, refused to hold municipal
corporations liable for the negligent operation of their trucks have been
outmoded by a provision of the Motor Vehicle Code which makes all
local governmental units liable for the negligence of their employees in
driving any of their vehicles, including those belonging to volunteer fire
departments.49 Although the supreme court initially chose to subvert
the obvious meaning of the statute by refusing to apply it to the vehicles
of a non-volunteer fire department, the legislature has now made its words
too plain to avoid. 0
In general, little special treatment has been given municipal corporations as to responsibility for their land and buildings. Liability has been
imposed in connection with parks, playgrounds, swimming pools, city
buildings, firehouses, incinerators, land leased to a school district, and
45. This is evident from the nature of county officers: judges, district attorney,
prothonotary, recorder of deeds, register of wills, coroner, etc.
46. Reedy v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 365, 69 A.2d 93 (1949) (sidewalk); Aloia v.
City of Washington, 361 Pa. 620, 65 A.2d 685 (1949) (street). The reporers abound
with street and sidewalk cases but there are apparently no late bridge cases; see note
31 supra. As to highways, see note 15 supra and text. Cf. Chidester v. Pittsburgh,
354 Pa. 417, 47 A.2d 130 (1946) (outdoor stairway).
47. See Sahm, upra note 34.

48. See note 24 supra. For reaffirmation of the corporate nature of utilities, see

Shirk v. Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169 AtI. 557 (1933) ; Armstrong & Latta v. Phila-

delphia, 249 Pa. 39, 94 Atl. 455 (1915).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §212 (1939).

See Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279
Pa. 549, 124 Atl. 273 (1924); Balashaitis v. Lackawanna County, 296 Pa. 83, 145
Atl. 691 (1929).
50. In Devers v. Scranton, 308 Pa. 13, 161 Atl. 540 (1932), the court held (1)

that a fire truck was not a motor vehicle and (2) that had the legislature intended

to include vehicles of a paid fire department it would have said so as it did for volunteer fire departments. The Code was amended by P.L. 2329, § 1, June 29, 1937, to

include fire department equipment. See Schulz, The Liability of Municipal Corporations for Torts in Pennsylvania, 40 DicK. L. RFV. 137, 162 (1936).
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vacant property. 5' Two of the park cases are notable for the extremes to
which they go: in Honaman v. Philadelphia a passing pedestrian was
struck by a foul ball hit in a pick-up baseball game being played inside
the park; 52 in Stevens v. Pittsburgh a stray bullet from the gun of a
youth, who was unauthorizedly firing on an old range within the park,
struck a small boy outside the park;53 recoveries for both plaintiffs were
affirmed. Also in their status as landowners, municipal corporations have
been held responsible for nuisances maintained on their property.5 4
The area which has occasioned the greatest doubt, perhaps in this
whole field, concerns injuries occurring in city and county buildings,
courthouses and jails.55 It has already been seen that a theoretical differentiation between municipal and quasi-municipal corporations fails to explain the results of these cases.56 Very likely the solution of future cases
in this area will come from the test announced by Justice Stem: whether
or not the corporation is liable depends upon whether the activities conor governmental.5 7
ducted within the building are predominantly corporate
58
The utility of this test is as yet undetermined.
At the opposite end of the spectrum there are situations in which the
courts have consistently relieved municipal corporations of liability. Most
of these instances involve activities which have traditionally been performed by government alone. Typical are cases concerning the misfeasance of police officers and firemen.8 9 In the same category are the
maintenance of jails, polling places and buildings used, primarily for the
administration of justice.60 Beyond this the courts have refused to hold
51. Styer v. Reading, 360 Pa. 212, 61 A.2d 382 (1948) (playground) ; Ligouri
v. Philadelphia, 351 Pa. 494, 41 A.2d 563 (1945) (swimming pool); Bonczek v.
Philadelphia, 338 Pa. 484, 13 A.2d 414 (1940) (park); Bell v. Pittsburgh, 297 Pa.
185, 146 Atl. 567 (1929) (city building) ; Siwak v. Rankin Borough, 72 Pa. Super.
218 (1919) (incinerator) ; Kies v. Erie City, 169 Pa. 598, 32 Atl. 621 (1895) (firehouse); Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. 109, 26 Ad. 304 (1893) (vacant land);
Briegel v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451, 19 Atl. 1038 (1890) (land leased to school).
But cf. Rosenblit v. Philadelphia, 28 Pa. Super. 587 (1905) (land used by school).
52. 322 Pa. 535, 185 Atl. 750, reversing 121 Pa. Super. 262, 183 At. 446 (1936).
53. 129 Pa. Super. 5, 194 Atl. 563 (1937), affirned without opinion, 329 Pa. 496,
198 AtI. 655 (1938).
54. Briegel v. Philadelphia, supra note 51; Siwak v. Rankin Borough, supra
note 51; see Commonwealth v. Wilkinsburg Borough, 37 Pa. Super. 160 (1908).
55. See text at notes 32 to 39 supra; Cousins v. Butler County, 73 Pa. Super. 86
(1919) (jail).
56. See text at notes 38 to 41 mtpra.
57. Hartness v. Allegheny County, 349 Pa. 248, 252, 37 A.2d 18, 20 (1944).
58. The precise criterion is uncertain. It may be that the court is simply to determine whether the number of governmental functions exceeds the number of corporate functions or that one type is to be weighed against the other according to the
number of rooms occupied or the number of persons employed or that the overall
atmosphere of the building will be decisive.
59. Steele v. McKeesport, 298 Pa. 116, 148 At. 53 (1929) ; Kies v. Erie City,
135 Pa. 144, 19 At. 942 (1890) ; Elliott v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874).
60. Cousins v. Butler County, 73 Pa. Super. 86 (1919) (jail) ; Kraeling v. Dormont Borough, 352 Pa. 644, 44 A.2d 274 (1945) (polls); Hartness v. Allegheny
County, supra note 57 (building).
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municipalities liable for the negligent operation of an ash collection vehicle, 61
for an injury on the premises of a dump or a sewage disposal plant,6 or
for the improper construction of sewers 6s--but there are strong indications that a different result would obtain in more meritorious cases of
64
this type.
Other cases resulting in nonliability are not so easily rationalized or
recognized. Many are based on the premise that the exercise of discretion by a municipal officer is a governmental function. For example,
where it was alleged that injury was caused by inadequate capacity of
sewers, it was held that the decision as to size of sewers was discretionary
and governmental. 5 The same result obtained as to the capacity and
number of reservoirs and the necessity of a footwalk on a bridge." Other
"functions are simply described as governmental: the- enforcement of an
ordinance prescribing one-way traffic; 67 timely letting of contracts necessary to the profitable completion of a contract already let to plaintiff. 68
And in one instance the supreme court simply ignored the mandatory
provisions of a statute requiring the city to purchase a materialmen's bond
and said that no liability attached for failure to exercise this governmental
function. 69
The difficulty attending any attempt to align the decided cases is shared
by the courts. The supreme court has applied contrasting labels to the
same function in different cases.70 Occasionally, decisions are rendered
without reference to the governmental-corporate rule or are placed on
grounds that permit the court to defer a ruling on the status of the particular activity.71 It is not extraordinary for the courts to tackle a knotty
tort question in preference to adding another complication to the theory
of municipal liability. The court's reluctance and uncertainty are well
demonstrated in one appealing case where the essence of the reasoning
was, "We are not satisfied, however, that the principle of nonliability for
61. Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 AtI. 273 (1924), decided before

passage of the statute in note 49 supra.
62. Gourley v. Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 112, 44 A.2d 270 (1945); Krepcho v. Erie,
145 Pa. Super. 424, 21 A.2d 444 (1941).

63. Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. 213 (1863).
64. The cases cited in notes 62 and 63 stpra were decided on questions of tort

law. See Pennsylvania R. R. v.. Pittsburgh, 335 Pa. 449, 6 A.2d 907 (1939)
native holding basing liability on negligent maintenance of sewers).

(alter-

65. Carr v. The Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860). Cf. Munn v. Pittsburgh,
40 Pa. 364 (1861).
66. Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. 420 (1871) ; Lehigh County v. Hoffort, 116 Pa. 119, 9
Atl. 177 (1887).
67. Doughty v. Philadelphia R. T. Co., 321 Pa. 136, 184 Atl. 93 (1936).
68. Shenk v. Erie County, 319 Pa. 100, 178 Atl. 662 (1935).

69. Szilagyi v. Bethlehem, 312 Pa. 260, 167 Atl. 782 (1933).
70. Compare McCormick v. Allegheny County, 263 Pa. 146, 106 Atl. 203 (1919),

and Lower Macungie Township v. Merkhoffer, 71 Pa. 276 (1872), with Szilagyi v.
Bethlehem, supra note 69, and Collins v. Commonwealth, 262 Pa. 572, 106 Atl. 229
(1919).
71. See cases cited in notes 19 and 62 supra. See also Onstott v. Allegheny

County, 338 Pa. 206, 12 A.2d 785 (1940).
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negligence in the performance of a governmental function . . . should
apply to the facts in this case. We doubt the wisdom of extending the
rule to cover this situation." T2 The remainder of this opinion considered
questions of substantive tort law. There should be little amazement that,
with this loose judicial treatment of the announced principles, the bar
should find it difficult to predict the outcome of cases at hand and the
writers should describe the rules as a "maze of shadowy distinctions," 73
a "tangle of disagreement and confusion," 74 and "as logical as those governing French irregular verbs." 76
DEcIsIoNAL SUBSTRATA

Theoretically, a finding that a specific function is "governmental"
dictates a decision of nonliability and a finding of "corporate," a decision
that the corporation is liable. The mechanical result which follows the
application of one or the other of these labels is similar to that consequent
upon the application of such terms as "in the scope of employment" or
"material breach" in other fields of law."0 This similarity suggests that
the method of factor analysis employed in probing these familiar terms
might be profitably adapted to determine the fundamental bases for deci7
sions in the field of municipal tort liability.
Fiscal Considerations.--An important factor in a number of Pennsylvania decisions has been fear that payment of tort claims of the
type under consideration would deplete municipal funds. Somewhat akin
to judicial alarm at the prospect of a flood of litigation, this feeling has
occasionally been expressed and has likely been influential at other times.
It once inspired President Judge Keller to record in an opinion the number of sidewalk breaks which he had counted during his Saturday evening
stroll through downtown Pittsburgh. 78 Other judges have noted with
concern the many miles of streets and sidewalks which are potential sources
of municipal liability.1 9 In the most forthright expression of this anxiety,

Justice Gordon pictured the entire school system paralyzed while its funds
were applied to the payment of tort claims, and concluded:
"This is certainly running the idea of individual compensation
to the last degree of absurdity; it is . . . profitable indeed to the
individual but ruinous to the public .... ," 80
72. Reichvalder v. Borough of Taylor, 322 Pa. 72, 76, 185 Atl. 270, 271 (1936).
73. Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 516, 72 S.E. 228, 230 (1911).
74. PRossER, ToRTs 1066 (1941).
75. Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or
ProprietaryTest, 22 VA. L. REv. 910, 938 (1936).
76. RESTATEmENT, AGECY §§ 220, 228 (1933) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 274
(1932).
77. RESTATEmENT, AGENCY § 229 (1933) ; RFSTATEmENT, CoNTRACrS § 275 (1932).
78. German v. McKeesport City, 137 Pa. Super. 41, 50, 8 A.2d 437, 441 (1939).
79. E.g., McGlinn v. Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 478, 186 At. 747 (1936).
80. Ford v. Kendall Borough School District, 121 Pa. 543, 549, 15 At. 812, 816
(1888).
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A large portion of the liability of municipal corporations has arisen
in cases where concern about the corporation's coffers has been mitigated
by the revenue-producing features of the activity under scrutiny. The
prime example is the municipally owned utility; the supply of gas, water
and electricity has long been labeled corporate. 8 ' Then, too, there may
have been a feeling that, when municipalities compete with private enterprise, they should not have the advantage of reduced operating expenses
which evasion of tort liability would give them. Outside the utility field
there has been little occasion to discuss either income or municipal funds.
It is doubtless significant that the decisions which opened the way to the
most expensive areas of liability today, i.e., streets and sidewalks, were
made at a time when there were comparatively few miles of streets and
sidewalks, very little and slow-moving traffic of a different type from that
familiar today, and little prospect of great expense.
Another manifestation of the courts' regard for municipal finances is
found in an occasional analogy to the immunity of charitable institutions.
It has been said that public funds are to be devoted to specified purposes
and may not legally be used to compensate damages caused by government employees;S2 and that, in the performance of certain functions, the
municipal corporation acts as a charity and is entitled to immunity.83
Although the desirability of the charitable immunity theory might be qtiestioned, s4 it is important here only to note the existence of another indication of judicial protection of the municipal budget.
Interference with government.-The courts have repeatedly refused
to impose liability upon municipalities where the issue involved performance of regulatory duties or exercise of discretion by public officials.
Some courts state simply that the function is governmental.8 5 Other
courts base their decisions on undefined "public policy." 86 In neither instance is any inkling of the real basis of the decision apparent. Behind
the cryptic phraseology of the judges may be one or more of several
possible notions. Possibly these decisions are simply mute subjections to
the theory of sovereign immunity. Again, they may be manifestations
of the court's reluctance to substitute its judgment for that of public
officials upon whom the legislature has placed that burden.87 This last
possibility might serve to explain the cases involving discretionary functions.88 However, a somewhat broader consideration seems to be a reasonable basis for all decisions in this area: the knowledge that their actions
might result 'in a suit against the government and judicial inquiry into
See note 48 supra.
Ford v. Kendall Borough School District, supra note 80.
Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 557, 124 Atl. 273 (1924).
Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. oF PA. L. RFv. 191 (1928).
See note 67 mspra.
E.g., Cousins v. Butler County, 73 Pa. Super. 86 (1919).
Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A
Comparative Survey, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 181, 192 (1942).
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

88. See Carr v. The Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860).
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their activities would inhibit vigorous, unfettered prosecution of duties by
public employees whose positions might be jeopardized by these consequences. Whether this or some other basis is the real explanation, it
seems clear that the courts have believed that to permit tort liability here
would invite some vague but intolerable interference with essential governmental activities.
The intensity as well as the blinding effect of this feeling is demonstrated most strikingly in the leading Hartness case. 9 There a pedestrian
passing before a courthouse was injured by snow falling from the
roof. The court absolved the county because "there is no more important
function of government than to provide for the administration of justice. ...

,"90

Just how the administration of justice would be affected

by the claim of this plaintiff is rather obscure but the court offers no
other reason for its decision. The unhappy alternative is that the court
may have applied the governmental label automatically and without compelling reason. There were certainly cases which would have supported
a contrary decision had the court been inclined to follow them. 9'
Moral obligation.-Opposedto these pressures is what may be termed
obligation of the community to compensate those who are inmoral
the
jured by the community's servants. A municipal corporation is designed
to render services to those who support it; in justice, payment for injuries
caused by the organization should be a part of the cost of the services.
This realization, and recognition of the obvious frailty of the immunity
doctrine, has led a multitude of legal commentators to urge that government on all levels assume responsibility for the tortious acts of its
servants. 92 The writers assert that immunity is anachronistic in a society
93
The sucharacterized by increasingly pervasive governmental activity.
preme court has not been entirely insensitive to this stimulus: on occasion,
94
Howthe writer of an opinion has called weakly for corrective legislation.
ever, it is wishful to attribute any significant departure from established
law to this factor. Perhaps it had some unconscious influence in the early
cases. It might be responsible for Pennsylvania's minority stand on the
liability of municipal corporations for the maintenance of parks and playgrounds. 95 Possibly it was given considerable weight in some of the
most meritorious cases of first impression; but in many other cases of
89. Hartness v. Allegheny County, 349 Pa. 248, 37 A.2d 18 (1944).
90. Id. at 251, 37 A.2d at 19.
91. See Bell v. Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 185, 146 Atl. 567 (1929) ; Fox v. Philadelphia,
208 Pa. 127, 57 Atl. 356 (1904) ; Kies v. Erie City, 169 Pa. 598, 32 Atl. 621 (1895).
92. See note 3 supra.
93. Borchard, supra note 2, at 805; Repko, supra note 3, at 233.
94. E.g., Honaman v. Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 535, 537, 185 Atl. 750, 751 (1936);
Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 560, 124 Atl. 273, 277 (1924).
95. The majority of states do not allow recovery for negligent park maintenance.
19 McQumuIN, MUNIcrPAL Co PoRATioNs § 53.112 (3d ed. 1950) ; Borchard, Governnent Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 229, 239 (1925).
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equal merit there is absolutely no indication that it has been considered. 9°;
A reasonable conclusion seems to be that Pennsylvania's supreme court
has refused, and will continue to refuse, to be cast in the role of a reformer.
APPRAISAL

Despite the barrage of criticism which has been aimed at governmental
immunity and the governmental-corporate rule, little remedial action has
been taken. The New York legislature and the Florida supreme court are as
yet lonely pioneers in the field of reform.9 7 Writers, well aware of judicial
regard for precedent, have generally looked to the legislatures for change.98
Except for the enlightened provision which was incorporated in the Motor
Vehicle Code in 1929, there has been no response by the Pennsylvania
legislature.9 9 Whether the legislature or the supreme court will alter its
position may well depend upon its future appraisal of the factors leading
to the court's decisions. Consequently, it is appropriate to examine the
validity of the two factors which have led the courts to shield municipalities
from tort liability.
The more compelling, if it be valid, is the possibility of interference
with the activities of public officials."1 ° Certainly any influence tending to
discourage energetic law enforcement and efficient government administration should be carefully examined. It does not appear, however, that
the imposition of tort liability conflicts with these interests. Since a public
officer is also personally liable in most cases where the city would bei liable
for his negligence,' 0 ' it would not seem that the city's liability would affect
his conduct or attitude. Even if it happened that the officer was judgmentproof, it is doubtful that he would trouble himself over possible expense
to the city. A more troublesome problem arises where the city responsibility stems from the exercise of discretion by an employee.' 0 2 Knowledge
that his judgment may be reviewed by a jury might deter an official from
taking vigorous affirmative action. This disadvantage should not be oppressive as long as the courts require only a reasonable standard of conduct and it may well have a desirable salutary effect on lackadaisical
officials. No doubt it would be politically inconvenient to have the dere96. Compare Hartness v. Allegheny County, supra note 89, and Scibilia v. Philadelphia, supra note 94, with the cases cited in note 94 upra and Reichvalder v.
Borough of Taylor, 322 Pa. 72, 185 Atl. 270 (1936).
97. Note, Tort Liability of Municipal Corporationsin New York, 23 ST. Jo HN's
L. REy. 117 (1948); Comment, 21 FLA. L.J. 152 (1947). The Federal Government
waived its sovereign immunity to tort liability in The Federal Tort Claims Act;
Note, 98 U. oF PA. L. REv. 884 (1950).

Inasmuch as the Federal Government, like

the 48 states, had absolute immunity, no troublesome distinctions had arisen.
98. Repko, supra note 3, at 230.
99. See notes 49 and 50 supra.
100. See text at notes 85 to 91 supra.
101. Blachly and Oatman, supra note 87, at 192.
102. E.g., Szilagyi v. Bethlehem, 312 Pa. 260, 167 Atl. 782 (1933); Shenk v.
Erie County, 319 Pa. 100, 178 Atl. 662 (1935).
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lictions of governmental officials aired in court; but this is assumedly not
the type of interference with government which the courts have in mind.
Hence, it would seem that this disturbing theoretical objection is but a
minor practical consideration.
Uppermost in the judges' minds has been a perpetual fear that an
extension of liability will bankrupt the local government. 01 3 As more
figures become available, the reason for this fear is rapidly vanishing.' 4
Tort liability cost in large and small cities is much less than was imagined.
The procedure followed by Pennsylvania cities and counties, though not
uniform and differing from that of other states in some respects, has met
the present problem and minimized the expense.'0 5 There are several
factors responsible for the comparatively small cost in Pennsylvania. Solicitors for the larger municipalities, which bear a disproportionately high
share of the liability, 16 have specialized in this field and have attained such
proficiency that experienced counsel for plaintiffs prefer not to join the
07
municipality whenever another responsible defendant can be reached.'
Insurance relieves local government from the problems of tort liability in
many areas and serves to stabilize the cost.' 0 8 Municipal responsibility for
defective sidewalks, a frequent source of litigation, and street openings is
only secondary; the municipality is usually saved expense by joining the
landowner or contractor as an additional defendant who is primarily liable
and, if not judgment-proof, pays the damages.' 09 It is now a general practice to write into all contracts a broad indemnification clause by which the
contractor agrees to save the city harmless from any liability which might
arise in performance of the contract.' 10 The legislature has helped to
eliminate false and exaggerated claims by requiring that timely notices be
given the municipal defendant."' In the court room the jury's predilec103. See text at notes 78 to 84 supra.

104. Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HAgv. L.
REV. 437 (1941) ; Schroeder, Administration of Municipal Tort Liability in Cleveland,
9 OHmO ST. LJ. 412 (1948); Warp, The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort
Liability, 28 VA. L. Rav. 360 (1942); David and French, Public Tort Liability Administration; Organization, Methods, and Expense, 9 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 348

(1942); Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Smnll Municipalities, 9 Id. 363.
105. E.g., Philadelphia's general policy is to litigate the majority of claims. Compare with Schroeder, supra note 104. Philadelphia's tort liability expenditures have
been about $110,000 each year for the past two years. For earlier figures see Rosenblum, Pennsylvania Negligence Law and Procedure, 288 INs. L.J. 3, 4 (1947).
106. Figures are unavailable but scattered reports and the frequency with which
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia appear as defendants substantiate this. Likely the more
intense activity and faster pace in the metropolitan areas are responsible.
107. Opinion of Mr. Israel K. Levy, Special Assistant to City Solicitor, Philadelphia.
108. E.g., letters from city solicitors of Butler, Lancaster, Lebanon, New Castle,
and Duquesne, all third class cities of Pennsylvania. Pittsburgh and Philadelphia
are considered better off as self-insurers. See Schroeder, supra note 104, at 435.
109. This was made possible by the Scire Facias Act of 1929, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 141 (1931). See Rosenblum, supra note 105, at 4. Present procedure is prescribed by PA. R. Cr. P. 2252; see 4 ANDERSON, PENNSYLVANIA. Cmiv.

et seq. (1950).
110. Statement of Mr. Levy; letter of city solicitor of Lebanon, Pa.
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2774 (1931).

PRACTI E 400

See Rosenblum, supra note 105 at

106

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

tion for the plaintiff is counterbalanced by the judge's appreciation for the
defendant municipality's problems.1 1 2 Each of these factors and a measure of
good luck, as some solicitors venture, has helped to keep the price of
tort liability at a minimum despite judicial fears.
There is no doubt that to strike down governmental immunity would
increase the over-all cost of tort liability to municipal and, especially, to
quasi-municipal corporations. That this increase would be so great as to
vindicate the qualms of the bench is improbable. A few years ago it would
have been necessary to hypothesize the situations which might arise in
the absence of immunity and attempt to divine their respective -solutions.
Today such conjecture is unnecessary. Since governmental immunity was
waived in New York,"13 the experience of its courts has unfolded in a
pattern which would likely be followed in Pennsylvania under the same
circumstances. In New York it is already apparent that, in much of the
area once protected by immunity, municipalities now escape liability by
application of substantive tort law." 4 Consequently, the expansion of
liability has been less than imagined and the cost increase has beeg
modest." 5 There is no reason to expect different results in Pennsylvania.
CONCLUSION
Behind the misleading verbiage about governmental and corporate
functions, corporations and quasi-corporations, duty and discretion, appears to be a basic clash between local government's moral obligation to
recompense the victims of its torts and an abiding fear that to do so would
be financially disastrous. This conflict has produced artificial and inequitable distinctions; whether one falls in front of a court house or in front of
a city hall should be immaterial in terms of either factor. It is evident
that the cost of municipal tort liability is not now excessive and probably
would not be so in the absence of the immunity which has wrought these
inequities. The legislative imposition of liability with respect to motor
vehicles was a long stride forward, but its limited effect has cut across the
mottled pattern of municipal tort liability and, consequently, increased
the disparity among victims of governmental torts. To eliminate this confusion and injustice the legislature must follow up its first venture: the
application of immunity to municipal corporations should be erased and
the community compelled to pay its way in society.
Ira B. Coldren, Jr.
112. Opinion of Mr. Levy.
113. Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York-Sequel, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv.
38 (1949).
114. Id. at 44. For court treatment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Note,
98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 884 (1950) ; 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1022 (1951).
115. MacDonald, The Administration of a Tort Liability Law in New York, 9
LAw & CoNTP. PRoB. 262, 281 (1942).

